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 Are single stock futures used as an alternative during a short-selling ban? 
The reaction of the single stock futures (SSF) market to the UK short-selling ban in 
2008-09 is investigated. The study tests the hypothesis that traders use SSF as a 
substitute instrument for short-selling, in which case they will shift to SSF trading 
when short-sales are banned. A significant increase in the trading activity of SSF in 
the London market during the 2008-09 ban period is documented, accompanied by 
narrower spreads, i.e. higher liquidity. Volatility did not react to the ban which 
suggests that the increase in trading activity did not weaken SSF market quality. 
The quality of the underlying market in the presence of SSF is also assessed and the 
results suggest that SSF market activity has neither positive nor negative effects on 
the underlying assets’ liquidity, volatility, and volume during the ban period. The 
findings offer important insights into the merits of SSF and the effectiveness of 
regulatory interventions on short-selling. 
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1. Introduction 
Single stock futures (SSF) are a cost-effective trading instrument and offer advantages over 
trading in stocks. Ang and Cheng (2005a) argue that these derivatives are a potentially vital 
instrument for institutional and individual investors. Mitchell (2003, p.4) states that 
“investing, speculating, hedging, and market making can be facilitated with the use of SSF”. 
Moreover, SSF represent an alternative to securities lending/borrowing. Taking a long (short) 
SSF position provides similar advantages to lending (borrowing) the underlying stock while 
reducing fees and counterparty risk. Since SSF have lower margin requirements, they 
represent a cheap and less risky alternative mechanism to short-selling. Danielsen et al. 
(2009) examine the impact of the launch of SSF on the short-selling and trading features of 
underlying stocks in the US. Their evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that SSF 
represent a plausible alternative to short-selling because costs related to short sales and the 
level of short-selling decrease after the introduction of SSF. 
Short-sellers are heavily criticised for contributing to stock market crashes. Following 
the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, many market regulators implemented 
restrictions on short-selling. On September 18th, 2008, the UK Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) announced a ban on short-selling financial stocks, which was in place until January 
16th, 2009.2 This emergency measure was an effort to stabilise markets, especially in bank 
stocks, whereby short-selling was a strong contributor to the massive selloff occurring 
globally.3 However, many researchers question the effectiveness and benefits of such 
intervention. Based on theoretical models and empirical findings, short-selling enables traders 
to react to bad news, therefore any constraint on short-sales will decelerate price discovery 
and reduce market liquidity, without necessarily stemming price declines.4 This liquidity 
                                                          
2 The FSA announced the end of the ban on January 5th, 2009.  
3 See “Short sale ban spreads around the globe”, Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2008. 
4 For example, Jones and Lamont (2002); Diamond and Verrecchia (1987); Bai et al. (2006). 
4 
 
shock, especially during the severe conditions of a crisis, is demonstrated to have a negative 
impact on stocks and fixed income markets (e.g. Danciulescu, 2009). Under these short-sale 
constraints, sophisticated traders may migrate to SSF to establish similar short positions to 
those they would have achieved by short-selling. 
This paper aims to identify whether short-sellers acknowledge SSF to be low-cost 
alternatives to short-selling. If this is the case, they will migrate to SSF if they can no longer 
short sell due to a ban. The reaction of trading activity, liquidity, and volatility are examined 
during the UK short-selling ban in 2008-09. A shift to SSF trading would imply that these 
instruments could be used by market participants to circumvent bans on short-selling. This 
paper offers a unique contribution in these respects. 
A difference-in-difference analysis is conducted whereby the Lisbon SSF market acts 
as a control group. The results indicate a significant increase in the number of quotes for SSF 
in the London market, accompanied by an increase in market liquidity. The volatility of the 
SSF market in London did not react, which suggests that SSF markets can absorb elevated 
trading activity while maintaining market quality. 
Prior literature suggests that SSF trading leads to more efficient pricing in the 
underlying market (e.g. Ang and Cheng, 2005b; Shastri et al., 2008; Danielsen et al., 2009). 
Based on this argument, the quality of the underlying stock trading in the presence of SSF is 
assessed during the short-selling ban. SSF are expected to mitigate the effect of the ban on 
their underlying stocks such that the latter are more liquid, more frequently traded, and less 
volatile than stocks without SSF. This study finds no evidence that SSF improve the 
underlying market’s quality during the ban.  Finally, the impact of the ban on SSF mispricing 
is investigated. In the absence of short-sale constraints, futures underpricing can be exploited 
by shorting the stock and going long futures, thus reducing the magnitude of the mispricing. 
Therefore, SSF mispricing is expected to be more prevalent during the short-selling ban. 
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Consistent with theoretical prediction, the findings suggest that the level of SSF mispricing 
increases during the ban. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses prior literature on SSF and 
short-selling. The data and methodology are explained in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. SSF and the underlying market 
There is an established debate about the impact of derivatives trading on the underlying stock 
market. Some researchers argue that derivative markets destabilise the spot market as they are 
used by speculators as tools for price manipulation and thus increase volatility.5 Others argue 
that derivatives encourage arbitrageurs to trade against uninformed trading demand, hence 
correcting any mispricing and maintaining asset prices at their fundamental values.6  
Several studies examine the impact of the introduction of SSF on the underlying market 
in terms of metrics such as volatility, pricing efficiency and cost reduction. Lee and Tong 
(1998) find that the introduction of SSF at the Sydney Futures Exchange did not induce any 
changes in volatility. McKenzie et al. (2001) find that SSF listing induces a significant 
decline in the systematic risk in the underlying market, where the response of volatility is 
firm-dependent. Ang and Cheng (2005b) demonstrate that the presence of SSF improves 
market efficiency and stability. This is revealed by a decline in the price volatility of stocks 
with SSF listings after their introduction to the US market in 2002. Ang and Cheng (2005b) 
provide evidence suggesting that informed traders (arbitrageurs) might prefer SSF to options 
as they represent a cheaper mechanism to exploit mispricing in the spot market. Hence, SSF 
                                                          
5 e.g. Kuprianov (1995).  
6 e.g. Figlewski and Webb (1993); Phillips (2011). 
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trading contributes to more efficient pricing in the underlying market. These results are 
supported by Shastri et al. (2008), who show that the information efficiency and market 
quality of the underlying market improved significantly compared to the pre-SSF period. 
Overall, prior literature suggests that the introduction of SSF contributes to the 
stabilisation of the underlying stock markets by reducing price volatility, improving price 
efficiency, and increasing market quality. Indeed, trading in SSF offers two major advantages 
over trading in the spot market. First, SSF relax short-selling constraints by enabling 
investors to establish a short position in an asset. Short-selling is subject to higher costs and 
risks, plus legal and institutional restrictions. In order to short a stock, an investor must find 
an owner willing to lend the stock in question and the lender requires a fee. Once the stock is 
borrowed, the borrower bears the risk of the lender recalling the stock at any time. Second, 
SSF have lower margin requirements than spot market trades.7 Hence, SSF enable holding a 
short position on a certain stock at lower costs while incurring less risk. Danielsen et al. 
(2009) provide evidence that short-sellers migrate to SSF at their introduction in the US 
market, while the underlying market’s bid-ask spreads (quoted and effective) fall after SSF 
introduction, accompanied by a decrease in short-selling costs and the level of short sales. 
One might argue that options offer similar advantages. However, options have non-
linear payoffs and require buying and selling options with the same strike and maturity as the 
SSF contract in order to create a similar short position. In relation to market quality 
improvements, SSF are found to contribute a higher proportion of the price discovery process 
compared to options (Chakravarty et al., 2004).  
                                                          
7 See Table 2.1 (p. 11) in Mitchell (2003) for a detailed comparison of equities and SSF. 
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2.2. Market reactions to short-selling bans 
Several researchers have investigated the effect of short-selling restrictions on asset prices 
and market efficiency. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that short-sales constraints 
hinder price discovery as they prevent asset prices from promptly reflecting private 
information known to sophisticated traders. The delay caused in the price discovery process 
implies uncertainty and consequently reduced liquidity. Bai et al.’s (2006) model shows that 
a short-selling ban’s effect on prices could take two directions. It has an upward effect on 
prices as it lessens market liquidity and selling pressure, and a downward effect on prices as 
it weakens the information content of prices. 
Prior studies document negative effects of short-selling bans on market quality. Marsh 
and Payne (2012) study the extent to which the UK short-sale restrictions (2008-09) were 
effective in supporting the UK stock markets, and find that the ban failed to support both 
financial and non-financial stocks. Prices were following a downward trend and strong 
selling pressure existed before the ban. Compared to non-financial stocks, the ban 
undermined the liquidity of financial stocks. Moreover, the efficiency and information 
content of trading deteriorated during the ban for financials compared to non-financial stocks. 
Boehmer et al. (2013) examine the implications of short-sale restrictions in the US during 
autumn 2008 by comparing the liquidity (bid-ask spread and price impact) of financial stocks 
subject to the ban and those that were not. Stocks targeted by the ban were significantly less 
liquid than others. Considering data from around the world, Beber and Pagano (2013) explore 
the implications of short-sale restrictions on market liquidity, the price discovery process, and 
stock prices. They find that the regulatory interventions are accompanied by wider spreads 
and inferior price discovery, without improving stock price performance. 
Counter-intuitively, Battalio and Schultz (2010) find that short-sellers did not shift to 
options as an alternative to short-selling. Grundy et al. (2012) provide similar evidence on the 
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reaction of options markets to the US short-sale ban. They explain that traders’ ability to 
establish a short-sale-like position by buying a put option depends on finding a writer able to 
short-sell the underlying. The only participants allowed to short sell during the US ban were 
options market makers. Grundy et al. (2012) also report a significant widening of spreads for 
options on stocks targeted by the ban, and a dramatic drop in option trading volumes. 
The above evidence suggests that short-sale restrictions did not necessarily meet 
regulators’ expectations. In the presence of bans, market quality (measured by liquidity, price 
impact, and volume) worsened for both equity and options markets. This study offers a 
substantial contribution by linking a short-selling ban to SSF contracts in a unique setting.  
2.3. Hypotheses 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, several financial authorities in Europe 
announced restrictions on short sales (covered and/or naked). Table 1 lists these bans, their 
durations and their nature. The UK FSA announced on September 18th, 2008 a ban on net 
position short-selling in financial stocks at the London Stock Exchange, which was lifted on 
January 16th, 2009.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
This paper tests the hypothesis that SSF constitute a viable substitute to short-selling. 
On this basis, an immediate increase in demand for trading in SSF should be observed when 
the ban begins. Second, if a negative relationship exists between spread and trading activity, 
narrower spreads in SSF during a ban period are expected. The SSF market’s reactions to a 
short-selling ban are assessed by testing three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Short-sellers migrate to SSF trading after the introduction of the ban, 
which will be revealed by an increase in trading activity; 
9 
 
Hypothesis 2: If a negative relationship exists between trading activity and spread, any 
increase in SSF trading activity will lead to narrower bid-ask spreads;8 
Hypothesis 3: SSF volatility will decrease during the ban period if narrower spreads are 
accompanied by lower volatility in this market structure.9  
Moreover, the paper examines the impact of SSF trading on the underlying market quality 
(measured by liquidity, volume, and volatility). Prior literature reports that SSF improve the 
underlying market quality as their introduction is accompanied by a decline in information 
asymmetry and trading costs in the stock market. However, there is contrasting prior 
evidence on whether SSF trading has an impact on the underlying market’s volatility. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
SSF began trading in London in June 2003. In this SSF market structure, liquidity is provided 
by designated market makers (DMM) who facilitate customer order flow by setting bid-ask 
spreads for a stipulated level of demand.10 The trading day starts at 08:00 and ends at 18:00. 
The SSF data comprise time-stamped observations on all SSF quotes including contract type, 
expiration date and price in the London and Lisbon markets, from January 2008 until 
December 2010.11 The dataset comprises 135 SSF contracts in London and 13 in Lisbon. For 
the analysis, different maturities for each contract are defined as follows: short-maturity 
contracts with less than 30 days to expiry; medium-maturity contracts with between 30 and 
60 days to expiry; long-maturity contracts with more than 60 days to expiry. Daily data on 
SSF open interest are collected from Bloomberg and Datastream for the sample period. 
                                                          
8 See George and Longstaff (1993); Wang et al. (1997); among others. 
9 See Wang et al. (1994); among others. 
10 See https://derivatives.euronext.com/en/stock-futures/liquidity-provider-programmes 
11 A number of days’ data between January 5th and February 9th 2009 do not contain bid prices, which rules out 
estimates of spreads on those days. The exchange confirmed that the data was indeed missing and there were no 
alternative sources to supply data for those days. 
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The SSFs’ underlying stocks trade in NYSE Euronext markets including Amsterdam, 
Brussels, and Paris. Data on the underlying assets (including bid and ask prices, volume, 
earnings per share, dividend per share, and market capitalisation) are collected from 
Bloomberg and Datastream. Similar data are collected for stocks traded in NYSE Euronext 
Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris without SSF. For the London SSFs, there are 135 stocks with 
SSF (treatment group) and 1,019 stocks without SSF (control group). Euribor data are 
collected from the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Statistical Data Warehouse.12 Data from 
January 2008 until December 2009 are used to assess the ban effect, and data from 2010 are 
used for placebo tests. 
In order to pursue the paper’s objectives, daily data is created from the intraday SSF 
data. Let t represent the time when the bid and ask quotes are observed. The quoted 
percentage spread is calculated by dividing the difference between ask and bid prices by the 
midpoint, for each SSF contract i for each maturity (short, medium, long):13 
%BASi,t =
p
i,t
A −  p
i,t
B
Pi,t
M  (1)   
Where pt
A and pt
Bare the ask and bid prices, respectively. The midpoint price is the average of 
the bid and ask prices: 
Pi,t
M =
p
i,t
A +  p
i,t
B
2
 (2)   
In order to create daily data, the average percentage spread is calculated over each 
trading day d, for each SSF contract i for each maturity: 
                                                          
12 See http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/.  
13 Note that contracts with less than 7 days to maturity are not included, as is standard practice in related 
derivatives literature. 
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BASi,d = ∑
%BASi,t
Ni,d
N
t=1
 (3)   
Where Ni,d is the number of quotations of a given contract with a given maturity on trading 
day d. 
For each SSF contract i, for each maturity, the daily volatility is measured by the 
absolute return defined as in Ding et al. (1993): 
RISKi,d = |
Pi,d
M − Pi,d−1
M
Pi,d−1
M | ∗ 100 (4)   
Where Pi,d
M and Pi,d−1
M  are the last observed midpoint SSF prices on days d and d −
1,  respectively. 
Finally, the daily trading activity is estimated by the number of quotes on each trading 
day d, for each contract i in each maturity group. 
All measures are calculated for both the London and Lisbon SSF markets. 
The underlying market’s quality is measured by the bid-ask spread, trading volume, and 
volatility. For each stock s, the daily bid-ask spread is calculated as expressed in Equation 
(1). The volatility measure for a stock s traded in the underlying market is also given by the 
absolute return: 
RISKs,d = |
Ps,d − Ps,d−1
Ps,,d−1
| ∗ 100 (5)   
Where Ps,d and Ps,dare the closing prices on days d and d − 1,  respectively. 
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3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. Spread – volatility – trading activity relationship  
Prior to considering the market reactions to the short-selling ban, the spread-volatility-trading 
activity relationship is investigated. The SSF market structure is similar to that of a specialist 
market because of the presence of DMMs. In such a context, microstructure literature 
predicts an inverse spread-trading activity relationship and a direct spread-volatility 
relationship, where trading activity and volatility are two of the main determinants of 
spreads.14 Existing literature suggests that higher trading activity is expected to narrow 
spreads. Providing liquidity in infrequently traded assets will be costly because market 
makers are exposed to greater risk, i.e. there exists an inverse relationship between spreads 
and trading activity. Microstructure models predict that higher volatility is expected to widen 
spreads because market makers will aim to protect their positions. The spread-volatility 
relationship is normally positive. Therefore, SSF bid-ask spreads are expected to respond to 
changes in trading activity and volatility. 
In order to test this relationship, the following equation is estimated: 
BASi,d =  β0 + β1Activityi,d +  β2Riski,d +  εi,d (6)   
Where Activityi,d is defined as the daily trading activity of an SSF contract i on a day d. 
Equation (6) is estimated with the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). This is 
efficient in producing robust estimates, particularly when facing potential endogeneity 
problems. The purpose of this estimation is solely to establish the nature of the relationship 
between spreads, trading activity, and volatility. The estimation is run for the London and 
Lisbon markets separately, and for each maturity group separately. 
                                                          
14 These models explain the bid-ask spread as (i) the price of immediacy, i.e. the cost of processing and fulfilling 
an order (e.g O’Hara and Oldfield, 1986); or (ii) the cost arising from information asymmetry (e.g. 
Bessembinder, 1994). 
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3.2.2. Difference-in-difference test 
The primary focus is to assess the SSF market response to the short-selling ban, which is 
achieved using a difference-in-difference approach. The treatment is the short-selling ban and 
the aim is to estimate the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). The treatment group 
comprises SSF contracts traded in London while the control group is the Lisbon SSF market 
(both of which are in the same exchange ownership group).15 The short-selling restrictions 
were implemented shortly after the sudden collapse of Lehman Brothers, therefore, it is 
assumed that the market could not “prepare” for this event, and indeed, that short-sellers were 
profiting from trades in financial stocks up to this point (due to other events in the crisis). 
Two categorical variables are defined:  ban and treat. The ban variable represents the 
treatment and takes the value of 1 during the period of short-selling restrictions and 0 
otherwise. The treat variable represents the categories for the treatment/control group, i.e. 
treat = 0 for the control group and treat = 1 for the treatment group (London).  
A shift to the SSF market would cause an increased demand for trading, i.e. would be 
captured well by the number of quotes. Variations in the liquidity of the market (measured by 
the bid-ask spread) and its volatility are hypothesised to follow as a response to the increase 
in trading activity. Because the variables of interest could be influenced by the underlying 
equity’s firm size, it is appropriate to add market capitalisation to the model specification. 
The difference-in-difference coefficient is obtained by estimating the following model: 
Vari,d =  β0 + β1band + β2treati + β3treati ∗ band + β4 CAPi,d + εi,d (7)   
                                                          
15 A different specification was also considered, where, for each contract, the treatment variable takes the value 
of 1 with respect to the ban period in the home market of its underlying asset; and the treatment group 
comprised SSF written on stocks subjected to the ban. The results from such a specification imply that all SSF, 
regardless of their underlying market and the nature of their underlying assets, react to the ban. This reaction is 
more evident during the UK ban period. 
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Var represents one of trading activity, spreads, or volatility. β0 represents the level of Vari,d 
in the control group (Lisbon) outside of the treatment (ban). β1, the coefficient of the 
categorical variable band, captures the difference in Vari,d in the control group (Lisbon) 
during the ban. β2, the coefficient of the dummy variable treati, captures differences between 
the treatment market (contracts traded in London) and control (contracts traded in the Lisbon 
market) groups before and after the ban.16 The coefficient of interest here is β3, which 
captures the effect of the ban on the treated group. Finally, CAPi,d is the control variable for 
firm size. Equation (7) is estimated for the three variables, using the pooled data and for each 
maturity group separately.17 
In a separate exercise, a model similar to (7) is used to evaluate the underlying 
market’s quality during the ban period in the presence of SSF. The variable Vars,d represents 
spreads, trading, and volatility. The treated group comprises stocks with SSF and the control 
group comprises stocks without SSF (traded in NYSE Euronext Amsterdam, Brussels, and 
Paris). 
The difference-in-difference approach assumes that the trend in the control and 
treatment groups in the absence of the treatment is similar. Here, if there had been no ban, the 
assumption is that the trend in the variables of interest would be similar in contracts traded in 
both London and Lisbon. A placebo difference-in-difference test which consists of using a 
“fake” treatment group is performed to test this assumption. Specifically, the same 
difference-in-difference model is estimated using data from 2010 and using a “fake” ban 
period from September 18th, 2009 until January 16th, 2010. If the assumption is valid, the 
difference-in-difference estimator computed on the placebo data should not be significant, i.e. 
the fake ban should not have any impact on the variables of interest. 
                                                          
16 The only SSF contract written on a Portuguese financial stock subject to short selling restrictions (Banco 
Espírito Santo) is dropped from the control group. 
17 Both contracts written on financial and non-financial stocks are used for the estimation. 
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3.2.3. Propensity score matching and difference-in-difference 
An issue arises from the fact that units in the treatment and the control groups are not 
assigned randomly. Because contracts traded in London (treated) and Lisbon (control) differ 
in certain specific characteristics, the direct comparison of the outcome of the ban might be 
subject to potential bias. A matching exercise, using a propensity score, is used to improve 
the quality of the inference from the difference-in-difference estimates. The propensity score 
refers to the conditional probability that a unit will be assigned to the treatment group. It is 
most commonly defined by a logistic regression/probit model where the treatment is a 
function of a set of independent variables x (e.g. Austin, 2011): 
 p(x) =  prob( treat = 1|x)  (8)   
Estimating model (8) yields the predicted probability p̂(x). The independent variables x 
should represent factors based on which a unit receives the treatment or not. Ang and Cheng 
(2005a) report that SSF exchanges tend to list larger stocks. The SSF trading in London are 
written on larger firms than is the case for Lisbon SSF. Therefore, the covariate chosen for 
the calculation of propensity scores is firms’ market capitalisation.  
Once propensity scores are calculated, the conditioning method considered is n:1 
matching. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) note that combining the difference-in-difference 
method and propensity score matching produces high-quality results for the evaluation of a 
non-experimental treatment. Smith and Todd (2005) demonstrate that cross-sectional 
matching estimators are weaker and find that the most robust estimators are given by the 
difference-in-difference matching. The matching exercise combines an observation j from the 
control group with one or more observations i in the treatment group on the basis of their 
scores. The best match for observation i is found using a caliper, i.e. a pre-specified range 
|pi − pj| where p refers to the propensity score. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and 
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Austin’s (2011) recommendations, the caliper is set to a value of 0.20. Only matched units 
are then included in the difference-in-difference estimation method, following Girma and 
Görg (2007). 
This process will be reliable if the balance property is verified. The balancing condition 
is assessed by calculating the standardised mean difference for the covariate x between the 
treated and the control groups (e.g. Smith and Todd (2005)). If the standardised differences 
exceed an arbitrary criterion, the balancing condition is not satisfied. Here, 0.20 is considered 
as the threshold, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For a covariate x, the standardised 
difference, or bias, is calculated as: 
D(x) =  
100 ∗ |x̅T −  x̅C|
√s
2
T + s2C
2
  
(9)   
Where T and C refer to the treatment and control groups, respectively; x̅T and x̅C are the 
sample means of the covariate x, respectively; and s2T and  s
2
C are the sample standard 
deviations of the covariate x in the treatment and control groups, respectively. 
3.2.4. Nature of the shift to SSF and arbitrage opportunities 
After assessing the effect of the ban on SSF trading activity, the origins of any changes are 
investigated. The ban coincides with a financial crisis, which implies that trading could be 
driven by hedging (or an increase in investors’ risk aversion) and/or speculation. A plot of the 
number of quotes before, during and after the ban period conveys easily the nature of the 
effect of the ban on trading activity. The dynamics of trading activity for London and Lisbon 
SSF around September 18th, 2008 is depicted in Figure 1.18 There is a clearly discernible 
                                                          
18 The time period of partial missing data is excluded in Figure 1. See footnote 11. 
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effect on London SSF trading at the start of the ban period. Any effect in Lisbon is captured 
in the difference-in-difference design. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Distinguishing between speculative and hedging activity is based on the length of the 
holding period, i.e. shorter for speculators. According to Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), 
daily open interest can be used to capture hedging activity in derivative markets. Changes in 
open interest are combined with daily volume to proxy for speculative demand. For day d, 
Rd is calculated as follows: 
Rd =  
Activityd
|OId − OId−1|
 (10)   
Where OId and OId−1 are the daily open interest for days d and d − 1, respectively. Rd is 
used to measure the relative importance of speculators’ trading activity compared to hedgers’ 
activity. Therefore, high speculative demand would increase trading activity within the day 
but closure of positions would imply little impact on open interest. An increase in Rd 
suggests either an increase (decrease) in speculative activity or a decrease (increase) in 
hedging activity. Therefore, relatively higher speculative demand is associated with high Rd. 
Further, the impact of the ban on SSF mispricing is investigated. Theory suggests that 
prices can deviate from their fundamental value as a result of investors’ over- or under-
reaction to information. Short-sellers’ attempts to take advantage of these deviations move 
prices closer to their fair value (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987). MacKinlay and 
Ramaswamy (1988) argue that, in the absence of short-sale constraints, short-sellers are able 
to establish futures arbitrage portfolios. Arbitrageurs can exploit futures underpricing by 
shorting the stock and going long futures, thus reducing the magnitude of the mispricing. This 
can only be achieved without short-selling constraints in the underlying market, but this latter 
18 
 
condition does not apply to futures overpricing. Therefore, the magnitude of futures 
underpricing is larger than that of futures overpricing with short-selling constraints in the 
underlying market. Based on this argument, SSF mispricing is expected to be larger, 
especially on the lower bound, during the short-selling ban. 
Following Fung and Draper (1999), the fair price of an SSF contract on day d is 
calculated as: 
Fd
∗ =  Sd (1 + r – D)
t (11)   
Where Sd, r , D, and t are stock price on day d, the daily risk-free rate (proxied by the Euribor 
rate), the dividend payout ratio (dividends per share divided by earnings per share), and time 
to maturity as a fraction of a year, respectively. 
The mispricing is defined in Yadav and Pope (1994): 
πd =  
 Fd −  Fd
∗
Sd
 (12)   
Where Fd is the closing price of the SSF contract on the trading day d. πd
− (πd
+) represent 
negative (positive) values of πd, suggesting underpricing (overpricing). 
A one-way ANOVA test is used to compare the means of Rd, the trading activity, the 
level of mispricing, |πd|, πd
+ and  πd
− during four phases. Phase 0 is defined as the 20 days 
prior to the ban. Phase 1 is defined as the first 20 days of the ban; Phase 3 is defined as the 
last 20 days before January 5th, 2009, while Phase 2 is the period in between. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Spread – Volatility – Trading relationship 
This sub-section documents the relationship between the SSF bid-ask spread, volatility, and 
trading activity. As suggested by previous literature, a narrower spread is expected to be 
accompanied by a larger number of quotes and lower volatility. Table 2 presents the results of 
the estimation of Equation (6).19 
Based on Table 2, there exists a significant direct relationship between liquidity and 
trading activity. Higher levels of trading activity are therefore accompanied by narrower 
spreads. This is consistent for both the London and Lisbon markets and across maturities. 
Moreover, the results suggest a significant positive relationship between spreads and 
volatility, i.e. wider spreads are accompanied by higher volatility. The relationships found are 
in accordance with theoretical predictions and prior empirical findings (see Section 2). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. SSF and the short-selling ban 
The purpose of this section is to answer the question: Are SSF acknowledged as a viable 
substitute for short-selling? If the answer to this question is affirmative, short-sellers are 
expected to migrate to trading in SSF when they no longer have the ability to short sell. This 
is investigated with equation (7), whereby β3 is expected to be positive for the number of 
quotes, and negative for both spreads and volatility. 
Prior to the difference-in-difference estimation, a placebo test is conducted to 
investigate the common trend assumption. A fake treatment is created one year after the 
                                                          
19 The full dataset from 2008 to 2010 is used to estimate Equation (6). 
20 
 
actual ban, i.e. from September 18th, 2009 until January 16th, 2010, in order to address any 
potential seasonal effects. Table 3 displays the results of the placebo test. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The placebo difference-in-difference results show a significant negative effect of the 
“fake” treatment on trading activity, suggesting that trading activity dropped during the last 
third of 2009.20 The lower level of trading activity is accompanied by wider spreads and 
slightly lower volatility. The common trend assumption could not be verified with this fake 
ban. The assumption is, however, valid when other fake treatment dates are considered (e.g. 
June 1st, 2010 to August 1st, 2010). However, most importantly, these placebo tests do not 
indicate any upward trend in trading activity. 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (7). The estimated coefficient for the 
effect of the ban on trading activity is positive and strongly significant. Therefore, there is an 
increase in London SSF trading activity during the ban period resulting from a shift to trading 
in SSF. This is consistent for all maturity groups. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
For the bid-ask spreads, the estimated β3 is negative and strongly significant, which 
indicates that spreads are narrower after the ban takes effect. This is expected due to the 
negative relationship between spreads and trading activity, as reported in Table 2. The 
increase in trading activity is accompanied by narrower spreads, for the three maturity 
groups. Volatility shows a much weaker, statistically insignificant reaction. This suggests that 
volatility in SSF markets is robust to increased trading activity, i.e. an increase in trading in 
                                                          
20 This could be due to the drop in electronic trading volume in 2009 as announced by the London Stock 
Exchange news release. See 'LSE Reveals Year-On-Year Declines In Order Book Trading Volumes In 
December'. London Stock Exchange, January 8th, 2010. 
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SSF is not associated with a change in market quality.21,22 The model’s goodness of fit is 
higher for the number of quotes and spreads, where estimates are the most significant. 
The n:1 matching exercise reduces the number of contracts to 45 in London and 9 in 
Lisbon. First, the balance of the matched groups is tested. Table 5 reports the results of the 
balancing condition based on the n:1 matching approach. The comparison of standardised 
differences across groups (treatment and control) for both unmatched and matched samples, 
for the three maturities separately, show that the matching improves the balance of the 
sample by reducing the size bias by about 82% on average. The standardised differences of 
size are less than 0.21, which confirms the balancing property of the propensity score 
adjustment. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The matching and difference-in-difference results are presented in Table 6. The number 
of quotes and liquidity react as expected to the short-selling ban. The difference-in-difference 
matching estimates show that the level of trading activity increases significantly and that 
spreads are significantly narrower during the ban period. The reaction of volatility is benign 
which shows that SSF markets’ quality is not sensitive to the level of trading activity and that 
these markets can absorb high demands for trading without recording any change in volatility 
levels. These results strongly confirm the ‘pre-matching’ findings of Table 4. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
These results contrast with Grundy et al. (2012) who find that SSF trading in the US is 
unaffected during the US short-selling ban. The duration of the bans in the UK and the US 
                                                          
21 Similar tests are performed where volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the midpoint prices 
within each trading day and similar results are found. The ban does not have any effect on volatility. 
22 Several studies link market quality to short-term volatility and conclude that a decrease in volatility is a sign 
of enhanced market quality, e.g. Chordia et al. (2011).  
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differ. The US ban was much shorter, from September 19th to October 8th, 2008. Comparing 
the number of SSF contracts traded in the US and the UK suggests that SSF became more 
popular in the UK. In 2008, a total of 2.5 million SSF contracts were traded in the UK market 
compared to 4 million in the US. In 2009 (2010), the total number of contracts traded in the 
UK increased to 9.5 million (11.2 million), while US trading amounted to 2.9 million (4.9 
million) contracts.23 
4.3. SSF and underlying market quality 
Attention now turns to the quality of the underlying market during the ban in the presence of 
SSF. Section 2.1 discusses the relevant prior literature on this aspect. This subsection presents 
how the underlying stocks react during the ban compared with stocks on which no SSF are 
written.24 The treated and control groups are unbalanced in terms of firm size. Most stocks 
with SSF are considerably larger than those without SSF. Hence, the stocks are matched as 
described in Section 3.2.3. The matching exercise reduces the size bias in the unmatched 
sample by 85%.25  
 Table 7 reports the results of the difference-in-difference estimation in the 
unmatched and matched stock samples. In the unmatched sample, stocks with SSF are found 
to be more liquid, to have higher trading volume and volatility during the ban, compared to 
stocks without SSF. However, these effects disappear when the samples are matched by size, 
which implies that the effects of the ban are more prevalent in the largest firms which have 
listed SSF. This suggests that the presence of SSF does not improve the liquidity, the trading 
volume, nor the volatility level of the underlying stocks under restrictions on short sales. 
                                                          
23 The figures are obtained from the OneChicago and Eurex press releases in January of each year. 
24 Similar to Table 3 for SSF, a placebo test is conducted with a fake treatment to test the parallel trend 
assumption. The fake treatment is again set one year after the actual UK ban, i.e. from September 18th, 2009 
until January 16th, 2010. The results indicate that liquidity and volume have similar patterns in both the treated 
and control stocks outside the ban period. However, this assumption is not verified for volatility. The results are 
available on request. 
25 The results of the balance test are available on request (i.e. the equivalent of Table 5 for the stocks). 
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Consistent with Lee and Tong (1998) and Dennis and Sim (1999), SSF are not found to 
influence the effect of the ban on the market quality for their underlying stocks. The ban was 
implemented as a response to extreme market conditions, which can explain why the matched 
sample test does not support findings in McKenzie et al. (2001) and Danielsen et al. (2009). 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.4. Nature of the shift to SSF and arbitrage opportunities 
Is the increase in SSF trading driven by hedging or speculation? Figure 2 displays the 
dynamics of Rd (defined in Equation (10)) around the ban period in London. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Comparing the evolution of Rd and trading activity in Figure 2 gives a better insight 
into the nature of trading underlying the increased trading activity. The ratio Rd has several 
peaks before and during the ban. The spikes are in most cases synchronous with those 
observed in the number of quotes which implies that the increase in trading activity is mainly 
driven by high speculative demand. 
The conclusions drawn from the plot are confirmed by a one-way ANOVA test to 
compare the means of Rd and the trading activity in four phases. Table 8 reports the results. 
As defined in Section 3.2.4, Phase 0 represents the reference level of Rd and the number of 
quotes. The other estimates in each phase are the differentials between the variables’ mean 
values in that phase compared with Phase 0. Both Rd and the number of quotes significantly 
increase in the first 20 days of the ban compared to the pre-ban period. They remain 
significantly elevated during the ban then Rd falls in the last 20 days of available data. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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Further, the level of SSF mispricing is compared across the four phases. Table 8 reports 
that the absolute value of mispricing does not significantly change in the first 20 days of the 
ban. It is significantly higher during Phase 2 and the last 20 days of data. Similar results are 
found for negative and positive mispricing, in terms of the phases with statistically significant 
coefficients. Additionally, the mispricing levels react asymmetrically to restrictions on short-
selling. Consistent with theoretical prediction, the magnitude of the negative mispricing 
increases, i.e. underpriced SSF fall further below their fair value under short-selling 
constraints. The magnitude of positive mispricing decreases, i.e. the extent of overpricing 
reduced significantly under short-selling constraints. 
Referring back to Figure 1, the number of quotes remains higher than the pre-ban 
period after the UK ban’s expiry and then follows a downward trend to the end of 2009. This 
implies that speculators gradually (rather than immediately) revert to short-selling, as they are 
likely to still hold SSF with outstanding maturities. The ban expiry date was announced on 
January 5th, 2009, i.e. only 10 days before the end of the ban. It would take time for some 
positions to unwind. Also, short-selling bans in other European markets (see Table 1) 
remained in effect at this time, which is a further reason why short-sellers may not 
immediately alter their trading behaviour at the end of the UK ban. As suggested by the 
column for negative mispricing in Table 8, mispricing-related arbitrage demand could be a 
further important influence in the post-ban period. 
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5. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question: do market participants employ SSF 
as an alternative instrument to short-selling? The reaction of SSF markets to the short-selling 
ban in the UK from September 18th, 2008 to January 16th, 2009 is examined, considering the 
trading activity, liquidity, and volatility of SSF in London. The answer to the question is 
conclusively affirmative. The evidence is that SSF trading activity in London increases at the 
beginning of the ban period, accompanied with narrowing spreads, while volatility is not 
sensitive to the ban. The increased trading activity can be explained by an increase in demand 
from short-sellers as they shift to trading in SSF. Additional tests indicate that the increase in 
trading is predominantly speculative activity rather than hedging. The change in the trading 
activity level improves market liquidity as spreads become narrower during the restriction 
period. Despite the elevated SSF trading, volatility does not increase, which means that the 
SSF market is able to absorb the extra demand for trading without reducing market quality. In 
order to ensure reliable inferences, propensity score analysis is used to obtain a randomised 
treatment variable. The difference-in-difference specification is re-estimated using matched 
data and consistent estimates are found, which strongly confirms the findings.  
The study also investigates how SSFs’ underlying stocks react to the ban. In prior 
literature, restrictions on short selling are associated with deteriorations in market quality 
(e.g. Boehmer et al. 2013). This paper finds neutral evidence in that increased SSF trading 
neither improves nor worsens market quality in the underlying stocks during the ban. This 
could be due to the fact that the period considered is characterised by unique market 
conditions. However, there is evidence that market quality for the largest stocks is affected. 
Another test is conducted to investigate the level of SSF mispricing during the short 
selling ban. Short sale restrictions prevent arbitrageurs from exploiting futures underpricing 
by shorting the stock and going long futures. Therefore, the magnitude of any negative 
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mispricing is expected to increase during short selling bans. This is found to be true for SSF 
as their mispricing, in absolute value, increases during the ban period. The mispricing 
magnitudes react asymmetrically to restrictions on short-selling, as the negative mispricing 
became wider, while the positive mispricing narrowed. 
The findings strongly imply that market participants use SSF as a viable alternative to 
short-selling. Therefore, SSF represent a mechanism via which market participants can 
circumvent a short-selling ban. Further investigation shows that stocks with SSF have similar 
liquidity, trading volume, and volatility levels as size-matched stocks without SSF during the 
ban period. The findings have important implications for regulators, exchanges, and 
investors, and present further evidence on the effectiveness of regulatory interventions during 
financial crises.  
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Figure 1: Trading activity in SSF around the UK short-selling ban 
This figure displays the average number of quotes per day across all contracts traded in 
London and Lisbon. The UK short selling ban was effective from September 18th, 2008 to 
January 16th, 2009.  
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Figure 2: Ratio Rd and Number of Quotes 
This figure displays the average ratio Rd and the total number of quotes per day during the 
UK short-selling ban. Rd for day d is defined as follows: 
Rd =  
Activityd
|OId − OId−1|
 
Where OId and OId−1 are the daily open interest for days d and d − 1, respectively. Higher 
values of Rd indicate relatively high speculative activity. 
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Table 1: Short-Selling Ban Periods around Europe 
This table documents the periods during which short-selling was banned by different European 
financial authorities. The Nature of Ban column shows whether these restrictions are on naked 
short positions (NSS) or covered short positions (SS), and whether they are exclusive to 
financial stocks (FIN) or not (ALL). 
Country Start End Nature of Ban Source 
Belgium 23/09/2008 12/08/2011 NSS – FIN 
FSMA - Royal Decree 
of 23 September 2008 
France 23/09/2008 01/02/2011 SS – FIN 
AMF instruction n° 
2010-08 - AMF article  
223-37 
Germany 19/09/2008 21/01/2010 NSS – FIN 
BaFin  – General 
Decree Section 49 of 
the Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Verwaltungsverfahrens
gesetz (VwVfG) 
Italy 22/09/2008 01/08/2009 
SS - FIN until 
10/10/2008 then 
SS – ALL 
Consob  –  Resolutions 
n° 16622 and 16971 
Netherlands 22/09/2008 01/06/2009 
NSS until 
05/10/2008 then 
SS - FIN 
AFM Press release on 
September 22, 2008 
Portugal 22/09/2008 01/07/2010 NSS- FIN 
CMVM Press release 
on September 22, 2008 
Spain 22/09/2008 23/06/2009 NSS – FIN 
CNMV Communication 
on September 22, 2008 
United Kingdom 18/09/2008 16/01/2009 SS – FIN  
FSA Press release n° 
FSA/PN/102/2008 
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Table 2: The Spread-Volatility-Trading Activity Relationship 
This table presents the estimated coefficients of trading activity and volatility as 
explanatory variables of spread in London and Lisbon for all contracts and each 
maturity group. The model is estimated using GMM: 
BASi,d =  β0 + β1Activityi,d +  β2Riski,d +  εi,d 
Where i is the SSF contract, and d indicates the day on which the observation is 
recorded. 
  ALL SHORT MEDIUM LONG 
Panel A: Spreads in London 
   Intercept 0.668 0.651 0.681 0.685 
 
(184)*** (178)*** (180)*** (59.8)*** 
Activity (x103) -0.040 -0.070 -0.070 0.062 
 
(-17.1)*** (-34.4)*** (-29.4)*** (6.80)*** 
Volatility (x103) 0.366 1.820 0.982 -1.130 
 
(2.05)** (2.50)** (1.71)* (-3.31)*** 
R-Squared 0.004 0.025 0.018 0.003 
No. of Obs. 152102 53677 67410 31015 
Panel B: Spreads in Lisbon 
   Intercept 1.397 1.123 1.502 1.547 
 
(91.2)*** (75.8)*** (59.6)*** (76.8)*** 
Activity (x103) -0.910 -0.740 -1.630 -0.830 
 
(-18.7)*** (-13.0)*** (-17.9)*** (-15.3)*** 
Volatility 3.997 2.328 7.081 4.414 
 
(7.30)*** (5.61)*** (6.69)*** (6.05)*** 
R-Squared 0.023 0.031 0.034 0.030 
No. of Obs. 22901 6502 8358 8041 
Significance: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’  
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Table 3: Placebo Test for Parallel Trend in SSF 
This table shows results for the “fake” treatment of trading activity, 
bid-ask spread, and volatility, where the fake treatment is set between 
September 18th, 2009 and January 16th, 2010. Data from January 1st, 
2009 until December 31st, 2010 are used for this estimation.  
 
TRADING 
ACTIVITY 
BID-ASK 
SPREAD 
VOLATILITY 
Intercept 186.6 1.379 0.014 
 
(60.9)*** (73.6)*** (4.09)*** 
Treat 730.0 -0.734 -0.001 
 
(112)*** (-38.3)*** (-0.05) 
Fake Ban -7.734 -0.234 -0.007 
 
(-0.99) (-6.68)*** (-13.6)*** 
Treat*Fake Ban -286.0 0.200 -0.028 
 
(-23.9)*** (5.54)*** (-1.82)* 
Cap (x105) -141.0 -0.011 0.093 
 (-25.5)*** (-2.22)** (1.26) 
R-squared (x10) 0.740 0.650 0.001 
No. of Obs. = 175003 
Significance: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’ 
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Table 4: The Effect of the Short-Selling Ban on SSF – Initial Estimation 
This table represents the estimated coefficients of the difference-in-difference equation: 
Vari,d =  β0 + β1band +  β2treati + β3treati ∗ band + β4 CAPi,d + εi,d 
Where Var represents Trading Activity, Spread, and Volatility in each panel, i is the 
SSF contract, and d indicates the day on which the observation is recorded.  
 
ALL SHORT MEDIUM LONG 
Panel A: Trading Activity 
   Intercept 160.1 151.5 144.8 182.9 
 
(60.1)*** (43.5)*** (51.5)*** (41.8)*** 
Treat 530.5 560.8 551.6 453.1 
 
(103)*** (74.2)*** (86.4)*** (49.5)*** 
Ban 97.28 87.98 86.33 113.5 
 
(11.0)*** (8.67)*** (10.2)*** (8.06)*** 
Treat*Ban 697.2 744.3 712.8 576.8 
 
(36.4)*** (29.4)*** (31.4)*** (13.8)*** 
Cap (x103) -1.610 -1.720 -1.620 -1.350 
 
(-40.4)*** (-34.6)*** (-35.9)*** (-20.0)*** 
R-Squared 0.184 0.177 0.188 0.181 
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spreads 
   Intercept 1.189 0.943 1.249 1.334 
 
(83.9)*** (87.9)*** (54.6)*** (71.9)*** 
Treat -0.556 -0.335 -0.609 -0.671 
 
(-37.8)*** (-28.1)*** (-26.2)*** (-33.7)*** 
Ban 0.697 0.401 0.885 0.725 
 
(14.3)*** (16.6)*** (11.5)*** (16.5)*** 
Treat*Ban -0.654 -0.348 -0.838 -0.713 
 
(-13.3)*** (-13.6)*** (-10.8)*** (-15.8)*** 
Cap (x106) -0.018 0.123 -0.026 -0.267 
 
(-0.32) (1.49) (-0.43) (-4.08)*** 
R-Squared 0.068 0.018 0.071 0.203 
Panel C: Volatility 
   Intercept 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016 
 
(56.9)*** (33.9)*** (45.0)*** (36.5)*** 
Treat 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.011 
 
(16.1)*** (8.22)*** (10.4)*** (14.1)*** 
Ban 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.015 
 
(11.3)*** (6.30)*** (7.73)*** (8.51)*** 
Treat*Ban 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.007 
 
(1.60) (0.83) (0.22) (0.02) 
Cap (x106) -0.029 -0.027 -0.026 -0.041 
 
(-3.89)*** (-2.55)** (-3.15)*** (-3.31)*** 
R-Sq. (x10) 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.027 
No. of Obs. 102814 36212 44989 21613 
Significance: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’  
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Table 5: Balance Assessment of the Matched SSF groups 
This table shows the results of the balance assessment. The standardised difference of size is 
calculated as follows: 
D(size) =  
100 ∗  |x̅T −  x̅C|
√s
2
T +  s2C
2
 
Where T and C refer to the treatment and control groups, respectively; x̅T and x̅C are the sample 
means of the covariate x, respectively; and s2T and  s
2
C are the sample standard deviations of the 
covariate size in the treatment and control groups, respectively. 
    Unmatched Sample 
 
Matched Sample 
  
Mean 
D  
Mean 
D 
% Bias 
Reduction  Maturity 
 
Treatment Control 
 
Treatment Control 
Short 41374.56 4557.01 0.939 
 
5317.76 4700.48 0.196 79 
Medium 41349.70 4548.71 0.935 
 
5238.46 4618.20 0.205 78 
 Long 41273.47 4503.12 0.938 
 
6273.69 5938.29 0.108 88 
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Table 6: The Effect of the Short-Selling Ban on SSF – Matched Samples 
This table shows the results of the estimated difference-in-difference equation after 
matching treated contracts with control contracts based on a caliper = 0.20. The model 
is: 
Vari,d =  β0 + β1band +  β2treati + β3treati ∗ band + β4 CAPi,d + εi,d 
Where Var represents Trading Activity, Spread, and Volatility in each panel, i is the SSF 
contract, and d indicates the day on which the observation is recorded. 
 
ALL SHORT MEDIUM LONG 
Panel A:  Trading Activity 
  
 
Intercept 88.76 60.11 58.42 171.3 
 
(16.3)*** (6.99)*** (7.08)*** (13.9)*** 
Treat 538.1 585.1 580.4 423.3 
 
(72.0)*** (42.4)*** (49.1)*** (33.7)*** 
Ban 112.9 102.5 98.39 142.5 
 
(16.7)*** (10.1)*** (11.2)*** (8.73)*** 
Treat*Ban 266.3 307.3 253.4 222.7 
 
(10.6)*** (6.91)*** (6.92)*** (4.25)*** 
Cap 0.157 0.018 0.018 0.009 
 
(14.7)*** (10.2)*** (10.2)*** (4.57)*** 
R-Squared 0.300 0.318 0.341 0.224 
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread      
Intercept 1.302 1.033 1.390 1.618 
 
(81.4)*** (86.0)*** (46.6)*** (49.6)*** 
Treat -0.254 -0.143 -0.300 -0.317 
 
(-19.0)*** (-9.65)*** (-13.1)*** (-11.6)*** 
Ban 0.579 0.343 0.586 0.835 
 
(15.7)*** (13.4)*** (8.71)*** (10.8)*** 
Treat*Ban -0.619 -0.310 -0.598 -1.002 
 
(-15.5)*** (-9.07)*** (-8.39)*** (-11.9)*** 
Cap (x103) -0.042 -0.027 -0.053 -0.064 
 
(-24.1)*** (-17.5)*** (-15.1)*** (-18.2)*** 
R-Squared 0.094 0.092 0.093 0.141 
Panel C: Volatility      
Intercept 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018 
 
(29.5)*** (19.5)*** (18.5)*** (13.6)*** 
Treat 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.016 
 
(19.7)*** (9.87)*** (12.3)*** (12.1)*** 
Ban 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.017 
 
(15.7)*** (9.02)*** (9.18)*** (9.80)*** 
Treat*Ban (x103) 3.248 3.507 1.154 7.063 
 
(1.52) (0.93) (0.37) (0.14) 
Cap (x106) -0.003 -0.066 0.133 -0.326 
 
(-0.03) (-0.39) (0.79) (-1.45) 
R-Squared 0.049 0.047 0.056 0.049 
No. of Obs. 18084 5832 7226 5026 
Significance: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’  
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Table 7: The Ban’s Effect on Underlying Market Quality 
This table shows the results of the estimated difference-in-difference equation after 
matching treated stocks with control stocks based on a caliper = 0.20. The model is: 
Vars,d =  β0 + β1bant + β2treatd + β3treats ∗ band + β4 CAPs,d + εs,d 
Where Var represents Trading Activity, Spread, and Volatility in each panel, 𝑠 is the 
stock, and d indicates the day on which the observation is recorded. 
 
BID-ASK 
SPREAD 
VOLUME 
(x 103) 
VOLATILITY 
Panel A:  Unmatched Samples 
  
 
Intercept 5.068 254.2 1.827 
 
(113)*** (44.8)*** (262)*** 
Treat -3.544 6617 0.218 
 
(-68.3)*** (32.5)*** (11.4)*** 
Ban 1.862 78.49 1.041 
 
(14.9)*** (5.13)*** (45.4)*** 
Treat*Ban -1.646 
(-10.6)*** 
1090 0.717 
 
(2.60)** (11.2)*** 
Cap (x105) -0.200 224.5 -0.037 
 
(-33.1)*** (13.1)*** (-13.5)*** 
R-Squared 0.020 0.132 0.025 
No. of Obs. 492193 
Panel B: Matched Samples      
Intercept 0.138 -1678 1.851 
 
(10.7)*** (-11.6)*** (71.0)*** 
Treat 0.211 4486 0.143 
 
(16.1)*** (28.3)*** (6.79)*** 
Ban 0.238 1453 1.719 
 
(2.70)*** (12.9)*** (24.4)*** 
Treat*Ban -0.056 561.2 0.081 
 
(-0.53) (1.46) (0.83) 
Cap ( x105) -0.005 2709 -0.033 
 
(-0.67) (30.2)*** (-2.50)** 
R-Squared 0.005 0.057 0.080 
No. of Obs. 36085 
Significance: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’  
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Table 8: ANOVA Test in the Four Phases of the Ban 
This table contains the results of the ANOVA tests for whether there are significant 
differences in the average level of Rd (number of quotes divided by the change in 
open interest), the number of quotes, the level of mispricing, |πd|, the mean upper 
bound, πd
+, and lower bound, πd
−, across four phases of time. Phase 1 is defined as 
the first 20 days of the ban; Phase 3 is defined as the last 20 days before January 5th, 
2009; while Phase 2 is the period in between.  
Phase 0 is the reference level; the estimates for phases 1, 2, and 3 represent the 
differential between the mean in each phase and Phase 0. The test for Phase 0 is 
whether the variable in question equals zero. For the other phases, the question is 
whether the difference in the variable compared to its value in Phase 0 equals zero. 
Panel A: Rd and the Number of Quotes 
  
Rd No. Of Quotes 
Phase 0 
 
273.9 1564 
(4.89)*** (25.1)*** 
Phase 1 
 
144.2 1011 
(1.83)* (11.9)*** 
Phase 2 
 
163.5 1970 
(2.52)** (27.1)*** 
Phase 3 
 
-170.0 13.51 
(-1.91)* (0.13) 
Panel B: Levels of Absolute, Negative and Positive Mispricing 
  
Absolute 
Mispricing 
Negative 
Mispricing 
Positive 
Mispricing 
Phase 0 0.717 -0.783 0.568 
 (7.47)*** (-5.81)*** (25.2)*** 
Phase 1 0.127 -0.173 -0.025 
 (0.93) (-0.91) (-0.74) 
Phase 2 0.475 -0.701 -0.169 
 (3.89)*** (-4.12)*** (-5.71)*** 
Phase 3 0.346 -0.549 -0.196 
 (1.88)* (-2.16)** (-4.38)*** 
Significance: 0.01 ‘***’ 0.05 ‘**’ 0.1 ‘*’  
 
